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Abstract Until recently, governmental organizations
played a dominant and decisive role in natural resource
management. However, an increasing number of studies
indicate that this dominant role is developing towards a
more facilitating role as equal partner to improve efficiency
and create a leaner state. This approach is characterized by
complex collaborative relationships between various actors
and sectors on multiple levels. To understand this com-
plexity in the field of environmental management, we
conducted a social network analysis of floodplain man-
agement in the Dutch Rhine delta. We charted the current
interorganizational relationships between 43 organizations
involved in flood protection (blue network) and nature
management (green network) and explored the conse-
quences of abolishing the central actor in these networks.
The discontinuation of this actor will decrease the con-
nectedness of actors within the blue and green network and
may therefore have a large impact on the exchange of ideas
and decision-making processes. Furthermore, our research
shows the dependence of non-governmental actors on the
main governmental organizations. It seems that the Dutch
governmental organizations still have a dominant and
controlling role in floodplain management. This challenges
the alleged shift from a dominant government towards
collaborative governance and calls for detailed analysis of
actual governance.
Keywords Collaboration  Flood protection  Floodplain
management  Nature restoration  River management 
Social network analysis
Introduction
A key challenge for environmental management is the
number and diversity of the actors and sectors involved,
each with their own perceptions, interests, and resources
(Robinson et al. 2011). To address this challenge, multiple
collaborative approaches have been developed, such as
adaptive management (Folke et al. 2005; Pahl-Wostl et al.
2008; Stringer et al. 2006); multi-level governance
(Blomquist 2009; Gruby and Basurto 2014; Lienert et al.
2013); community-based natural resource management
(Kellert et al. 2000); network governance (Klijn et al. 1995;
Rhodes 2007), and collaborative governance (Emerson
et al. 2012). Despite their different foci, they share a
number of characteristics:
1. They all address collaborations across organizational
boundaries between diverse stakeholders, such as
governmental actors, non-governmental actors, and/or
citizens.
2. They all promise or expect better coordination between
authorities and more integrated management (Emerson
and Gerlak 2014).
3. They all assume a shift from state-centered, hierarchi-
cal top-down government towards less formalized
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governance by networks of interdependent stakehold-
ers that extend beyond the government sector (‘‘from
government to governance’’; Huitema and Meijerink
2014; Mostert 2015; Rhodes 1997; Termeer 2009).
Reasons given to collaborate include the limited
resources of government: government simply does not have
all the information, power, and finances necessary for
environmental management, which makes it dependent on
other stakeholders (Gray 1989; Huxham and Vangen
2005). Budget cuts over the past years have only increased
this dependence. Moreover, involving diverse stakeholders
can increase public support, reduce opposition, and
improve implementation of government policy. And
finally, there is the moral argument that involving stake-
holders makes environmental management more demo-
cratic (Mostert et al. 2007; Stringer et al. 2006).
Empirical studies on the alleged shift from government
to governance are scarce (e.g., Bodin and Crona 2009). In
England, Watson et al. (2009) described how recent
institutional reform in the water sector has actually
strengthened control by state water agencies, despite the
use of language emphasizing partnerships and collabora-
tive governance. Non-state actors and local authorities
have been given substantial roles in the implementation of
management measures, but the measures are still decided
upon by national government and national government
agencies, who also control implementation. Rather than
increasing democracy and responsiveness, this has reduced
public accountability because central government is able to
deflect the blame when things go wrong (Watson et al.
2009).
The account given by Watson et al. (2009) raises a
number of questions concerning the alleged shift from
government to governance. The aim of the present article is
to shed some more light on this issue and describe the
complexity of the current collaborative and cross-boundary
interactions between governmental and non-governmental
actors concerning environmental management, using a case
study approach. The method used is social network anal-
ysis (SNA: Borgatti et al. 2009). SNA analyzes social
networks in terms of a set of nodes (e.g., individuals or
organizations) and a set of ties between these nodes. It can
provide insight in the position and role of individual actors
in the network and help to identify central, coordinating,
and bridging organizations whose activities connect actors
that otherwise would not have been connected (Berkes
2009; Rathwell and Peterson 2012). The structure of ties
between these actors gives insight in intra and inter-group
collaboration (e.g., within government and between gov-
ernment and non-governmental actors) (Lienert et al.
2013). Finally, overall network properties, such as the
number of ties compared to the number of possible ties,
give insight in the potential for collaborative action and
structural cohesion in the network (Olsson et al. 2004).
The case that will be analyzed is the maintenance of
floodplains in the Dutch Rhine delta. The multi-function-
ality of these floodplains leads to interdependence of
stakeholders with respect to the different functions, espe-
cially concerning flood protection and nature restoration
(Fliervoet et al. 2013; Schindler et al. 2013). Both the
‘‘blue network’’ concerning flood protection and the ‘‘green
network’’ concerning nature will be analyzed. The fol-
lowing questions will be addressed:
(i) Which actors are involved and what are their
collaborative relationships to ensure flood protec-
tion (blue network) and/or reach nature objectives
(green network)?
(ii) Which actors play a coordinating or bridging role?
(iii) What is the role of governmental versus non-
governmental organizations in both networks?
The next section presents the case study and the
methodology used. Subsequently, the results are presented.
The article concludes with a discussion and conclusions on
the main research questions.
Method
Case Study: Floodplain Management
The case study that is central in this article is the mainte-
nance of the floodplains of the River Waal, the main branch
of the River Rhine in the Netherlands. The case study area
includes one province and 15 municipalities and covers a
river stretch of 80 km or 152 km2 (Fig. 1). The responsible
authorities regarding flood protection are the State Water
Agency (Directorate for Public Works and Water Man-
agement), which is responsible for the river itself and can
regulate all activities in the floodplains that influence the
water quality and quantity; and the Water Boards, which
are responsible for the dikes and levees. Responsibility for
maintaining and developing nature in the floodplains was
decentralized in 2014 from the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, which is also responsible for agriculture and nature
policy, to the provincial governments. The provincial
governments plan and implement EU Natura 2000 objec-
tives based on the European legislation and allocate sub-
sides for nature conservation. This may require changes in
land use, which is regulated by the municipalities.
Alongside the authorities, a variety of private individu-
als, groups, and organizations have an interest in the
maintenance activities in floodplains. These include nature
conservation organizations; farmers; research institutes;
and sand, gravel, and clay mining industries. The nature
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conservation organizations often deal with cultural heritage
as well. Many farmers are also interested in maintaining
biodiversity to be eligible for nature conservation subsi-
dies. They are organized in farmers’ associations which
combine agricultural activities with nature conservation.
In the 1990s, public and private stakeholders developed
and implemented integrated plans to improve flood pro-
tection while restoring dynamic natural processes and
safeguarding agriculture and recreational interests. These
plans involved for instance the construction of new side
channels through the floodplains that increased the dis-
charge capacity of the river and offered space for nature. In
this context, a program called ‘WaalWeelde’(in English:
‘Wealthy Waal’) was launched by the University of Nij-
megen in 2006 and adopted by the provincial government
in 2008 to connect public, private, and societal organiza-
tions in the planning and implementation phase of river
management (Smits 2009). Based on a bottom-up
approach, this integrated multi-player program aimed to
develop a safer, more natural, and economically stronger
riverine landscape.
Unfortunately, the integrated approach of the ‘Waal-
Weelde’ program has not been extended to the
maintenance of the floodplains, which remains sectoral.
This has resulted in new conflicts (Fliervoet et al. 2013).
Increasingly, stakeholders recognized that floodplain
management had become a very complex, dynamic, and
fragmented issue and that more integrated and collabora-
tive initiatives were needed to achieve sustainable flood-
plain management in the long-term (Fliervoet et al. 2013).
This recognition led to the establishment of a taskforce
‘floodplain management’ in October 2011, which aimed to
find an integrated, multi-player approach for the mainte-
nance of the newly constructed multifunctional river
landscapes, an approach that had been very successful in
the early planning and implementation phases. In their final
report, the taskforce proposed a new governance structure
consisting of a ‘Waal Board,’ in which different govern-
mental organizations would cooperate, and new private–
private collaborations between land owners and nature
conservation organizations, called ‘Stewardships.’ Mean-
while, the budgets of the governmental organizations
declined, and in 2015, one national governmental organi-
zation was even abolished completely: the Government
Service for Land and Water Management, which had 960
full time staff (2013 data: www.dienstlandelijkgebied.nl).
Fig. 1 Study area (based on the Figure in Fliervoet et al. 2013): a location of the ‘WaalWeelde’ program in The Netherlands, b the specific
locations of the fifteen municipalities (light gray) including the floodplain area (dark gray)
Environmental Management
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Data Sources and Data Collection: Selection
of Stakeholders
In this study, organizations were chosen as node level, as in
Stein et al. (2011), Ingold (2011), and Knoke et al. (1996).
The selection consisted of seventy organizations that
already cooperated in the ‘WaalWeelde’ program, com-
plemented with knowledge institutions and farmers asso-
ciations (Fliervoet et al. 2013). The ‘WaalWeelde’ program
included organizations based on their position, their role in
decision process, and their reputation (cf. Knoke 1993).
The key actors included governmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, businesses, knowledge insti-
tutions, and associations of farmers. Finally, the list was
checked by the chairman of the ‘WaalWeelde’ Taskforce
Floodplain Management.
The respondents were selected on the basis of the fol-
lowing criteria: (1) they represent one of the 70 listed
organizations; (2) they have a high position in their orga-
nization, such as director or manager. With this selection,
we ensured that respondents could represent the collabo-
rative relations of their organization. Large organizations
were split based on the level of departments or districts.
Respondents were asked by e-mail to fill in a survey about
their collaborative relations. This e-mail was followed up by
a reminder after 2 weeks and a phone call after 3 weeks. The
survey consisted of an introduction stating the objective and
questions on social characteristics, such as name and func-
tion of the respondent, name of the organization, scale of
activities, and involvement or interest in flood protection
(blue network) and/or nature (green network). Finally,
respondents were asked to select from a list of 70 organiza-
tions, the organizations with which they interacted and to
indicate the strength (frequency) of their interactions, for
flood protection and nature objectives separately. The
respondents could add missing organizations to the list. The
options given for strength were (1) yearly or less, (2) quar-
terly, (3) monthly, and (4) on a weekly basis.
Of the 70 initial organizations, two did not exist any-
more and four replied they were not involved in floodplain
management. Of the remaining 64 organizations, 47 filled
in the questionnaires, which constitutes a response rate of
73 percent. Seventeen organizations did not respond,
including seven municipalities. Seven respondents added in
total seventeen organizations. However, none of these
organizations were added by more than one respondent.
For this reason, we assume that the original list of orga-
nizations included the most relevant actors.
Social Network Analysis
The survey data were modified before analysis in the
software program UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002). Three
organizations were removed from the data because they
indicated no involvement or collaborative interests in either
flood protection or nature. Secondly, two respondents filled
in the survey for the provincial government; therefore, one
respondent was removed from the data. Ultimately, the
data of 43 actors were analyzed regarding collaborative
ties.
For the SNA in this paper, we used primarily reciprocated
collaborative ties, meaning that both actors indicated that
they collaborated. Since each tie depends on two actors, the
data are more robust to reporting errors (Stein et al. 2011). In
case actors indicated different meeting frequencies, the
lowest frequency was used. The data were clustered by
creating six groups based on the main organizational task or
function (Ernoul and Wardell-Johnson 2013; Prell et al.
2008). These were (1) Flood protection (Fld) (N = 6); (2)
Nature (Nat) (N = 11); (3) Agriculture (Agr) (N = 5); (4)
Research institutes (Res) (N = 5); (5) Special interest
groups (NGO/Businesses/Citizens) (Int) (N = 9); (6)
Coordinators or spatial planning (Crd) (N = 7).
Table 1 shows the network metrics used in the results
section. The networks were analyzed at three levels, i.e.,
(1) the network as a whole, (2) actor-groups, and (3)
individual actors.
Results
This section presents the results of the social network
analysis. First, we present and compare the whole-network
properties of the blue and green networks. Subsequently,
we focus on the involvement of the six groups of actors and
define the most central players in Dutch floodplain man-
agement. Finally, we discuss the likely effect of the abol-
ishment of the Government Service for Land and Water
Management.
Network Characteristics
Table 2 presents the social network data describing the
whole-network properties of the green and the blue net-
works, for all frequencies of collaboration and for monthly
and weekly collaboration. The blue network for all fre-
quencies consisted of 36 actors with reciprocal ties (out of
43 in total), and the green network of 42 actors (see also
Figs. 2, 3). Even with the higher number of actors, the
green network is denser by 30 % and has a higher degree of
centralization. Both networks have a relatively high cross-
boundary exchange and all groups are connected to the
network, which altogether implies a heterogeneous
network.
The density and degree centralization values combined
describe how well a network is connected. Both networks
Environmental Management
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Table 1 Metrics used
Level Metric Definition Interpretation and references
Whole-
network
properties
Density Number of ties in the network divided by the
maximum number ties possible (Borgatti et al. 2013)
The density metric analyzes the connectedness of the
network, which is also known as network closure
(Sandstro¨m and Rova 2010). The higher the network
density, the more potential there is for collective
action (Olsson et al. 2004). Bodin and Crona (2009)
argue that less dense networks have clearly
distinguishable subgroups, which could have
negative effects on the capacity for collaborative
processes among subgroups. However, a very high
network density may decrease the groups’
effectiveness in collective action (Oh et al. 2004)
because this can lead to homogenization of
knowledge, which decreases the capacity for solving
problems (Bodin and Norberg 2005)
Whole-
network
properties
Degree
centralization
The general procedure involved in centralization is to
look at the differences between the number of ties a
node has (also known as degree centrality) of the
most central point and those of all other points.
Centralization, then, is the ratio of the actual sum of
differences to the maximum possible sum of
differences, also known as the approach of Freeman
(1979) (Borgatti et al. 2013)
The degree centralization expresses how tightly the
graph is organized around its most central point
(Scott 1991) or, put differently, how ‘star-like’ the
network structure is (Sandstro¨m and Rova 2010). A
low degree centralization value indicates that many
actors have spatially centralized positions in the
network, which can refer to clearly distinguishable
subgroups and a low level of network cohesion
(Bodin and Crona 2009). A high degree of
centralization indicates that one or a few actors
(when the highest degree centrality is the same for
more organizations) are central actors in a star-like
configuration, see Fig. 1 from Gallemore and
Munroe (2013)
Whole-
network
properties
Cross-
boundary
exchange
Number of ties connecting actors with different
affiliations divided by the total number of
connections in the network and expressed as
percentage (Sandstro¨m and Rova 2010)
The cross-boundary exchange represents the ratio
between collaborative ties within groups and
between groups. It is a measure for the network
heterogeneity. A low cross-boundary exchange
indicates a relatively high tie density within groups
(Sandstro¨m and Rova 2010)
Group
properties
Group
exchange
Reciprocal ties connected to one group divided by the
total number of reciprocal ties in the network
This measure is used to identify dominant groups
based on Ernoul and Wardell-Johnson (2013). The
groups’ exchange (based on the group’s ties) within
the whole network can be expressed in percentages
Group
properties
Density by
group (cross-
table)
Density by group is the proportion of actual number of
ties and the maximum possible number of ties within
and between groups in a cross-table (Borgatti et al.
2013). The diagonal of the cross-table gives single
group densities (supplementary material; Table SD-C
and SD-D)
The higher the ‘‘Density by group’’, the more potential
for collective action between groups (Olsson et al.
2004). Density computed for all pairs of groups
indicates mutual strong groups, as opposed to the
group exchange, which defines the dominant groups
of the total network
Actor
properties
Degree
(centrality)
Number of ties of an actor, often distinguishing
between reciprocal ties, incoming ties (in-degree)
and outgoing ties (out-degree) (Hanneman and
Riddle 2005)
The number of ties an organization has (In-Degree,
Out-Degree or reciprocal ties) has been shown to
have a positive effect on that organization’s influence
(Bodin and Crona 2009), but does not give
information on the quality or frequency of the
connection (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). A high
number of Out-degree ties can indicate a high degree
of dependence on other organization, a high number
of In-degree ties can indicate a high degree of
dependence by other organizations on the
organization, and a high degree of reciprocal ties can
indicate a high degree of interdependence
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are well connected when focusing on all collaborative
frequencies (Fig. 2). The shape of the networks tends to a
centralized, wheel, or star-like network based on the high
degree centralization scores (all tie frequencies). However,
the higher degree centralization score of the green network
suggests that this network is more centralized.
When focusing on the two highest tie-strength classes
(monthly and weekly), both the blue and green whole-
network indicators drop. This has a large impact on the
connectedness of organizations in both networks, see for
example the huge decrease of total ties. Additionally,
twelve organizations drop out of the blue and green
network on top of the already disconnected actors,
especially actors of the research, agriculture, and special
interest group (Fig. 3). Figure 3 also shows the large
decrease of collaborative ties between the flood protec-
tion and nature group in both networks and the increase
of the importance of Crd1, the Government Service for
Land and Water Management. This actor holds the
majority of the weekly reciprocal ties (thick lines in
Fig. 3) and all remaining ties with the agricultural group.
In both networks, the collaborative ties of the special
interest group focus almost completely on organizations
in the nature group. The organizations with a nature
interest stay well connected in the green network, in spite
of focusing on the more frequent collaborations, except
Table 1 continued
Level Metric Definition Interpretation and references
Actor
properties
Betweenness
(centrality)
Probability of an organization being on the
shortest path between any two organizations
in the network
The actor could act as a bridge between other actors who are not
connected otherwise, which allows the actor to influence the
information flows and act as a gatekeeper or mediator (Bodin
and Crona 2009). These bridging organizations can play an
important role in facilitating cross-scale interactions in
environmental management (Rathwell and Peterson 2012)
Table 2 Characteristics of the ‘blue’ (flood protection) and ‘green’ (nature) network based on the reciprocal ties and frequency of collaboration
Size (number of nodes) Density Degree centralization Cross-boundary exchange (%) Total ties
Blue network (all frequencies) 36 0.175 0.516 75.32 316
Blue network (monthly and weekly) 24 0.033 0.340 70 60
Green network (all frequencies) 42 0.226 0.612 72.06 408
Green network (monthly and weekly) 30 0.044 0.403 65 80
A B
Fig. 2 Social networks based on all reciprocal ties concerning flood
protection objectives (a) and nature objectives (b). A gray node
indicates a governmental organization and a black node a non-
governmental organization. Numbers indicate the task or function of
the six groups: 1 flood protection; 2 research institutes; 3 special
interest groups; 4 nature; 5 agriculture; and 6 coordination or spatial
planning
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actor Nat10 (Foundation ‘Lingewaard Natuurlijk’), which
got disconnected.
Specifications of the Groups’ Involvement
When we distinguish between governmental and non-
governmental actors, we can clearly see the importance of
the former (Table 3). While the number of government
actors is smaller, they still account for 46 % (green net-
work, all frequencies) to 75 % (blue network, monthly and
weekly collaboration) of all ties. Flood protection and
coordination of spatial planning are core government tasks,
while nature is more a mixed governmental and non-gov-
ernmental responsibility (Fig. 2). Government becomes
even more important when low frequency ties are removed
(Table 3; Fig. 3).
Almost all groups are well connected to each other when
all tie strengths are included (Fig. 2). However, the flood
protection and agricultural group show little collaboration
between each other in either the blue or the green network.
In addition, Fig. 2 shows the higher number of collabora-
tive ties between the nature group on the one hand and the
coordination and research group on the other in the green
network as compared to the blue network.
Table 4 shows the actors grouped by their main tasks. In
the blue network, the actors with interest in flood protec-
tion and nature have the highest degree of group exchange.
Focusing on monthly and weekly ties only, the group
exchange of actors responsible for coordination or spatial
planning activities increases at the expense of research
institutes and special interest groups. The green network
shows a different pattern, with a high group exchange for
the actors of the nature objective (36 %) and a lower group
exchange for flood protection compared to the blue net-
work. The actors involved in a coordinating role show a
similar increase in group exchange when focusing on the
stronger ties representing monthly and weekly collabora-
tions, emphasizing their relative importance in the whole
network.
The group density is higher within groups than between
groups, especially in the green network (supplementary
material; Table SD-C and SD-D). The coordinating group
is an exception here, their highest tie density shifts along
with the issue at stake (flood protection or nature), so the
A B
Fig. 3 Social networks based on the monthly and weekly reciprocal
ties concerning flood protection objectives (a) and nature objectives
(b). Bold lines indicate the weekly ties. A gray node indicates a
governmental organization and a black node a non-governmental
organization. Numbers indicate the task or function of the six groups:
1 flood protection; 2 research institutes; 3 special interest groups; 4
nature; 5 agriculture; and 6 coordination or spatial planning
Table 3 The group exchange of the governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in the blue and green networks (in percentages)
Group
number
Type of organization Blue network (all
frequencies)
Blue network (monthly
and weekly)
Green network (all
frequencies)
Green network (monthly
and weekly)
1 Governmental organizations
(N = 17)
54
(density = 0.382)
75 (density = 0.125) 46 (density = 0.346) 65 (density = 0.140)
2 Non-governmental
organizations (N = 26)
46
(density = 0.123)
25 (density = 0.006) 54 (density = 0.197) 35 (density = 0.022)
Additionally, the density within the group is also indicated (see supplementary material for organizational attributes)
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coordination group interacts most strongly with flood
protection group in the blue network, and with the nature
group in the green network. This applies also to the group
of nature organizations, where the highest density scores
are reached with the flood protection group in the blue
network and with each other in the green network. More-
over, the group density scores show strong connections
within the flood protection group and the low density
scores among the organizations in the special interest
group, which classifies this as weak connected group.
The Central and Influential Organizations
The most central organizations in the blue and green net-
work have been determined based on their number of
reciprocal ties (degree centrality) and the amount of
incoming ties (In-degree centrality) (supplementary mate-
rial; Table SD-A and SD-B). The major difference between
the two is that reciprocal degree shows mutual recognition
while the In-degree values show the recognition of a col-
laborative actor by others only. In addition, the between-
ness values for each actor are analyzed to identify bridging
organizations.
The governmental actor Crd1 (Government Service for
Land and Water Management) has the highest number of
reciprocal and In-degree ties and the highest betweenness
scores in both networks, except for the number of In-degree
ties in the blue network, in which case it holds a third place
(28 and 34 reciprocal ties in the blue and the green network
respectively). Crd1 is the major broker among the coordi-
nators of spatial planning and between this group and all
other groups, especially the nature and flood protection
group. Its central position and the bridging role are clearly
visible in Fig. 3.
In the blue network, the second place, based on the
number of reciprocal ties, is occupied by Fld 1, the Delta
Program, with 27 reciprocal ties. This governmental actor
was designated as the most important collaborative orga-
nization by the others (In-degree value). Fld1 is responsible
for finding common ground for future flood protection
measures to deal with climate change. So, collaboration
between various actors is required, but also recognized by
the others. In the green network, the second place is held by
Nat7, the State Forestry Service, with 24 reciprocal ties.
Also the betweenness value is relatively high, which
expresses the influential role of the State Forestry Service
(supplementary material; Table SD-B).
The actor Fld3, State Water Agency, is by mandate an
important actor in river management with important man-
agement tasks and regulatory powers. It takes second place
in terms of the number of In-degree ties in both networks,
which shows that it is recognized by the other actors, but
the ties are not reciprocal: the State Water Agency itself
recognizes only a limited number of actors as collaborators.
This suggest an unequal relation. Similarly, the Water
Board (Fld6) appears in the top 5 for number of In-degree
ties in both the blue and green network, but not for
reciprocal ties. They also do not have an important bridg-
ing or coordinating function, according to their low
betweenness scores.
Surprisingly, given its mandate, the actor Nat6, province
of Gelderland, is not in the top 10 of reciprocal ties in both
networks. It only scores relatively high with respect to In-
degree ties in the green network, possibly because it holds
some regulatory powers concerning nature protection.
Discontinuation of the Most Central Actor
Due to state budget cuts, the Government Service for Land
and Water Management (Crd1) has been abolished on 1
March 2015. The effects of removing this governmental
actor can be seen by comparing Fig. 3, which shows the
situation until 1 March 2015 (reciprocal ties, weekly or
monthly), with Fig. 4, in which we have removed Crd1.
Assuming everything else remaining the same, all farmers’
associations and many other organizations will become
isolated and in fact drop out of the networks. In total, six
organizations will drop out of the blue network and seven
out of the green network. The bridging function of Crd1
between the flood protection and nature group will be lost.
Table 4 The group exchange in the blue and green networks (in percentages)
Group
number
Main interest Blue network
(all frequencies)
Blue network
(monthly and
weekly)
Green network
(all frequencies)
Green network
(monthly and weekly)
1 Flood protection (N = 6) 22 27 13 16
2 Nature (N = 11) 24 22 36 35
3 Agriculture (N = 5) 7 3 8 2.5
4 Research (N = 5) 9 5 11 4
5 Special interest groups (N = 9) 18 10 15 12.5
6 Coordinators or spatial planning (N = 7) 20 33 17 30
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Especially the blue network will become very fragmented;
the green network will still be held together by the group
with a nature affiliation.
Discussion
Complexity of Collaborative Floodplain
Management
In the article, two networks for maintaining floodplains
were analyzed, one with a focus on flood protection and the
other on nature, in order to increase insight in the com-
plexity of natural resources management and the alleged
changed role of government. The analysis has shown, first,
that both the blue and green networks are well-connected
and heterogeneous networks, with complex structural pat-
terns. Cross-boundary exchange (75 and 72 %, respec-
tively), network density, and degree centralization are
relatively high compared to other studies (Sandstro¨m and
Rova 2010; Stein et al. 2011).
The relatively high network density improves the
potential for collective action and collaboration (Olsson
et al. 2004) because well-connected networks facilitate
communication, foster mutual trust, and help to prevent or
manage conflicts (Bodin et al. 2006). Sandstro¨m and
Carlsson (2008) showed that high tie density promotes
joint-action, especially when many ties exist between dif-
ferent types of actors (e.g., between recreational fishermen
and governmental officials). The green network has a
higher network density than the blue network, indicating a
greater potential for collective action on nature issues. The
high ratio of relationships between different types of actors
can be observed in both the blue and the green network,
even for monthly and weekly ties.
The high density of the networks may also have some
adverse effects. An actor with too many ties may feel
obligated to please all or most of its collaborative partners.
This may reduce the actor’s possibilities for action (Bodin
and Crona 2009) and slow down progress, resulting in
‘partnership fatigue’ (Huxham et al. 2000, p. 347). More-
over, a tangle of collaborative ties may reduce transparency
and accountability (Huxham et al. 2000). In addition, a
dense network implies relatively few contacts with out-
siders that may have different points of views. This may
reduce the capability to innovate (Bodin and Norberg
2005).
The Dense Green Network and the Role of Nature
Organizations
The size of the green and the blue network indicates that
mutual recognition of collaborative partners is stronger in
the former than in the blue network (42 vs. 36, Table 2,
based on reciprocal ties). The organizations not included in
the blue network were mostly organizations with a main
interest in nature objectives or research institutes with an
ecological interest.
The clustering in groups is supported by the high group
density scores within the groups. In the blue network, three
groups play an equally dominant role, flood protection,
nature and coordination actors, especially when we focus
on weekly and monthly ties. The green network is, perhaps
not surprisingly, mostly dominated by the group of nature
organizations, which collaborate a lot with the coordinating
group and research institutes.
A B
Fig. 4 Social networks based on the monthly and weekly reciprocal
ties concerning collaboration in the blue (a) and green network
(b) after removing Crd1. Bold lines indicate the weekly ties. A gray
node indicates a governmental organization and a black node a non-
governmental organization. Numbers indicate the task or function of
the six groups: 1 flood protection; 2 research institutes; 3 special
interest groups; 4 nature; 5 agriculture; and 6 coordination or spatial
planning
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Overall, the respondents believed more strongly in the
added values of collaborative partnerships for nature
objectives than for flood protection objectives, reflected in
the higher green network density. There are several
explanations for this:
– The management of the flood protection objectives
could be seen as a governmental issue, while interest
for nature conservation and restoration issues is more
spread and recognized by non-governmental
organizations.
– Nature organizations need (strong) partnerships to
reach their objectives (Warner and van Buuren 2009),
whereas water agencies have strong regulatory powers
and their own funding.
– Nature organizations have much more experience with
collaborative processes than water agencies (Koontz
and Thomas 2006).
Central Actors
Analysis of the most intensive collaborative ties identified
the weak relationship between the nature and flood pro-
tection organizations as shown by the few weekly and
monthly ties between the two groups (Fig. 3). To our
knowledge, this has not yet been formally analyzed for
floodplain management, although the fragmented gover-
nance of Dutch floodplains is ‘‘general knowledge’’
(Fliervoet et al. 2013; Wiering and Van de Bilt 2006).
In both networks, the most central organization based on
degree centrality is the Government Service for Land and
Water Management (Cdr1), a national governmental
organization established for coordination, collaboration,
and implementation of spatial planning, i.e., a bridging
organization (Berkes 2009). The central position of Cdr1 in
both networks makes the organization a perfect candidate
to facilitate the idea of public–public collaboration (Waal
Board, see paragraph 2.1). Unfortunately, in the beginning
of 2015, this organization was disbanded due to national
state budget cuts. The second most influential role is des-
ignated to the Delta Program (Fld1) in the blue and the
State Forestry Service (Nat7) in the green network. These
organizations have much influence on the current collab-
orative network and could act as bridges between other
actors who are not connected otherwise, given their
betweenness value (Bodin and Crona 2009).
It is remarkable that the main authorities for nature were
not recognized as important collaborative partners (recip-
rocal ties): they were not even in the top-10. The provincial
government (Nat6) only recognized a couple of collabo-
rative partners within the green network. In addition, their
recognition by other actors (In-degree ties) is also rela-
tively low for a main authority. Their low ranking is
probably caused by the recent decentralization of the nature
policies from the ministry of Economic Affairs to the
provincial governments in 2014, which was maybe not yet
fully recognized by all actors. In contrast, the well-estab-
lished State Water Agency (region East) (Fld3) was rec-
ognized as an important collaborative partner by many
others (top-2 position based on In-degree ties), but did not
reciprocate this recognition. This low ratio of in- versus
out-degree ties shows the power and independence of the
State Water Agency and also the provincial government:
they do not need the other organizations to implement their
policies and select only a small number of collaborative
partners. To a lesser extent, this also applies to the position
of the Water Boards.
The Consequences of Removing a Central,
Governmental Actor
The states’ discontinuation of the most central govern-
mental organization (Cdr1) will most likely have a large
impact on the current collaborative structures, especially
on the flood protection network. Assuming all else
remaining the same, both structural integration and inclu-
siveness (Lockwood et al. 2010) will decline. Farmers’
associations and spatial planning agencies (municipalities)
will become disconnected. The number of links between
different groups, especially the nature and flood protection
group, will decrease. This may not only reduce opportu-
nities for collective action, but also make floodplain
maintenance less integrated (Lockwood et al. 2010).
According to Lauber et al. (2008), it may reduce the
exchange of ideas, decrease the access to funding, and
reduce the influence of certain stakeholders. Exchange of
ideas through the whole network is hampered by less net-
work cohesion, whereas in particular the municipalities and
associations of farmers will be disempowered by the loss of
the bridging function of Cdr1. Crd1 no longer brings
together diverse goals which will constrain the funding
opportunities, especially funding for nature, which depends
on third parties as it is often coupled with other goals.
Implications for the Government’s Role
Our data indicate that different groups of interest are
connected, but it also supports the idea that governmental
organizations still control and occupy central positions in
the network, like in United Kingdom (Watson et al. 2009,
see introduction). This challenges the alleged shift from
(hierarchical) government to (collaborative) governance.
Yes, there is a lot of collaboration, but there is also still a
lot of hierarchical government. The question is whether this
is necessarily bad and whether it could be different.
Government can play different roles in collaborations.
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Government bodies can be an active participant and use its
regulatory powers to implement its own policy and reach
its own objectives; it can coordinate and facilitate, like
Crd1 did; and it can stimulate collaboration hierarchically,
for instance, by changing the rules, selectively empowering
collaborators with fewer resources, and threatening to
impose regulation if no results are achieved (cf. the ‘‘sha-
dow of hierarchy’’: e.g., Bo¨rzel and Risse 2010; He´ritier
and Lehmkuhl 2008). If government takes on the first role
and tries to run the show on its own, it could frustrate
collaboration, but if it takes on the second or third role, or
both, it could potentially stimulate collaboration. In any
case, government still is important and most likely will
remain so.
Because of the importance of government, attempts to
improve the maintenance of the Dutch floodplains should
involve the governmental organizations. Watson et al.
(2009) argue that there is a greater need to recognize the
integration of land and water management at the local scale
and to develop appropriate institutional arrangements for
both policy making and policy implementation. In our case,
both the green and the blue networks rely on similar col-
laborative relationships. This offers opportunities for inte-
grating the maintenance of flood protection and nature
objectives at the local level and to collaboratively develop
an appropriate policy for sustainable floodplain manage-
ment. The basic idea is that a collaborative forum of
governmental organizations at higher levels can support
on-the-ground efforts of local groups (Margerum 2007).
The discontinuation of Cdr1 creates an opportunity to
simplify and restructure the network to ultimately achieve a
better integration of flood protection and nature manage-
ment in floodplains. At the local or regional level, a
coordinating or facilitating role could be played by the
State Forestry Service (region East), mainly based on their
central position in both networks. However, a coordinating
or facilitating role demands for an actor with a wide and a
more or less neutral perspective on the maintenance issues.
These requirements seems to fit better with the tasks and
function of the provincial government rather than the State
Forestry Service (region East), as well to keep the distance
between European and national policies and local actors as
small as possible.
Another candidate to take on a coordinating role would
be the Delta Program (Fld1), which holds the second and
third most central position in, respectively, the blue and
green network. The Delta Program started in 2009 as a
collaborative program involving public and private orga-
nizations, but it is now responsible for a yearly, returning
program to improve the flood protection levels and ensure
fresh water supply in the context of climate change.
Despite their main focus on water and planning, they have
the capacity to develop an integrated, long-term
maintenance vision for the floodplains. These ideas should
be studied more in-depth to prove the feasibility. In the
end, there would be one collaborative network concerning
floodplain management.
Still, it is worth emphasizing that effective collaborative
governance requires that governmental organizations do
not become too dominant and recognize others as collab-
orative partners. This is an important factor, alongside the
need for sharing responsibilities and knowledge, flexibility,
building trust and setting up learning environments for
collaborative governance (Emerson and Gerlak 2014). In
other words, collaborative governance cannot be achieved
without a change of thinking and acting of the central
government and its executive agencies (Watson et al.
2009).
Conclusions
In sum, this study demonstrated the complexity of collab-
orative relationships based on a case study on the mainte-
nance of the Dutch floodplains, using a social network
approach. The complexity was explored by focusing on the
networks regarding two conflicting issues: flood protection
and nature. The organizations in both networks are well
connected and diverse in terms of goals, whereby the
nature organizations possess the most collaborative ties.
The dense green (nature oriented) network includes more
organizations and collaborative relationships than the blue
(flood protection) network. This indicates that the potential
for collective action is higher in the green network. Anal-
ysis of the most frequent relationships (monthly and
weekly ties) showed that few frequent collaborative ties
existed between flood protection and nature groups.
The most central organization in both networks was
Crd1, a governmental organization focused on coordinating
land and water management. This organization had links
with many different interest groups and played an impor-
tant bridging role between the nature and flood protection
oriented organizations. Quite remarkably, this organization
has been abolished early 2015 due to state budget cuts in a
time period where collaboration is framed as a solution.
Removing a central actor from a dense network will have
consequences, especially in this case. Assuming all else
remaining the same, the structural integration of both net-
works will decrease, especially the bridging function of
Crd1 between the water agencies and nature organizations
will be lost. Additionally, groups, such as the associations
of farmers and municipalities, will become disconnected,
which may decrease their participation in and influence on
decision making. On the positive side, the discontinuation
of coordinating governmental actors will give opportunities
to simplify and restructure the complex collaborative
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network, for example, through a more facilitating role of
the provincial government, who could support on-the-
ground efforts of local groups.
In both the blue and green networks, governmental
actors have the highest number of reciprocal ties and
dominate the collaboration. The powerful and independent
role of the main authorities can be deduced from the dif-
ferences between the number of incoming and outgoing
ties, reflecting recognition by others and of others respec-
tively. Therefore, we argue that currently there is no shift
from ‘government to governance’ with respect to the
maintenance of the Dutch floodplains. To achieve more
collaborative governance, new collaborative relationships
have to be developed, which requires time, effort, and
recognition of non-governmental actors as full partners.
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